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2ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME INEQUALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF GLOBAL ECONOMIES-A
LINEAR AND A NON-LINEAR LONG-RUN ANALYSIS
This study employs panel data from 138 countries (with unbalanced time frameworks), to
investigate the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality. Both linear
and  non-linear  cointegration  methodologies  are  used  to  identify  a  long-run  equilibrium
relationship  between  i)  the  overall  economic  freedom  of  the  world  index  and  income
inequality, and ii) the major areas of the index and income inequality. The linear long-run
parameter estimates document that the association turns out to be negative, while the non-
linear  long-run parameter  estimates  illustrate  that  above a threshold point  the association
between economic freedom and income inequality is negative,  while below this threshold
point the association turns out to be positive. The empirical findings survive a number of
robustness tests, such as alternative measures of income inequality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Economic freedom is a multifaceted concept which can have differing relations with income
inequality at different stages of economic freedom. A number of studies have investigated
cross country differences in economic freedom, finding that it impacts economic factors, such
as income inequality, economic growth, democracy, and human development. These studies
document that is more prevalent for economic freedom to be substantially associated with
‘good’ outcomes, such as faster growth, better living standards, and more happiness, while
evidence  of  an association  of economic  freedom with ‘bad’ outcomes,  such as increased
income  inequality  is  not  uncommon.  A  number  of  recent  and  significant  survey  papers
provide detailed evidence about the voluminous works on the impact of economic freedom
3on the abovementioned economic variables (Gwartney et al., 2004; Doucouliagos, 2005; De
Haan et al.,  2006; Gwartney and Lawson, 2008; Rode and Coll,  2012; Hall and Lawson,
2014; Hall et al, 2016; among others).
However,  explicit  studies  undertaken on the role  of economic  freedom in income
inequality  are  sparse.  Grubel  (1998)  showed  that  increased  economic  freedom  did  not
adversely  affect  income  levels,  income  growth,  unemployment  rates,  and  human
development. Employing a panel of 39 countries and the EFW index, he argued that higher
levels  of  economic  freedom  increased  income  equality  by  extending  income  earning
prospects. His study also documented that a trade-off between economic freedom and income
equality  was  detected,  with  the  rate  of  trade-off  increasing  at  higher  levels  of  economic
freedom. Scully (2002) examined the role of economic freedom in economic growth and
income inequality. By making use of a number of methodological approaches, he concluded
that economic freedom led to higher equality, while there was a marginal trade-off between
growth  and  income  inequality.  In  an  investigation  of  economic  freedom  and  income
inequality  across  US  states,  Ashby  and  Sobel  (2008)  found  that  increases  in  economic
freedom corresponded with higher levels of income and income growth, and lower inequality.
Apergis et al. (2013) also examined the relationship between income inequality and economic
freedom  across  the  US  State.  Their  findings  highlighted  the  presence  of  bi-directional
causality between economic freedom and income inequality in both the short- and the long-
run. By contrast,  Murphy (2015) with an international panel of countries documented that
there was a negative impact on economic freedom coming from income inequality,  while
inequality led to higher sizes of government and reduced effects on the rule of law; minimal
effects also were supported on the soundness of money and freedom to trade, with ambiguous
effects on regulation activities. While these studies have made use of a linear framework to
disentangle the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality, two studies
by Carter (2006) and Bennett  and Vedder (2013) made use of a non-linear framework to
examine the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality. Carter (2006)
found evidence of the presence of a U-shaped curve between the two variables across an
international country set, while Bennett and Vedder (2013) documented the inflection points
at which additional increases to economic freedom across the US States resulted in lower
income inequality.
This paper comes to add to the relevant literature of the impact of economic freedom
on income inequality by accounting for non-linear effects as well as by explicitly considering
4the role of the major areas of the economic freedom metric. The contribution of this paper to
the  literature  is:  It  employs  both  linear  and  non-linear  panel  (Panel  Smooth  Transition
Regression - PSTR) cointegration methods. The non-linear estimations can provide further
insight  where the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality  changes
over different stages of economic freedom. We make use of the PSTR method of Gonzalez et
al. (2005) to explore potential threshold effects in the relationship between income inequality
and economic freedom. The PSTR takes into account heterogeneity by allowing regression
coefficients to vary as a function of an exogenous variable and fluctuate between regimes. As
the transition variable is individual-specific and time-varying, the regression coefficients for
each  of  the  individuals  in  the  panel  are  changing over  time.  Additionally,  this  approach
permits smooth changes in country-specific associations, depending on a threshold. In terms
of the non-linear approach paper by Carter (2006), our study makes use of a wider country
sample, while it explicitly considers how explicit sub-categories of the economic freedom
index affect the course of income inequality.
It also employs the Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW) (Version 2011),
recommended by Gwartney et al. (2006) to measure economic freedom, as well as the Gini
coefficient to measure income inequality. Moreover, certain areas of the EFW index could
lead  to  growth and reduce inequality  more  than other  areas.  The previous  studies  in  the
literature only investigate the effects of different areas of the EFW on economic growth. In
this case, our work additionally investigates the influence of these different areas, namely, the
size of government, legal system and security of property rights, sound money, freedom to
trade internationally, and regulation, on income inequality.
To foreshadow the empirical findings, the results highlight the negative association
between income inequality and all five disaggregated components of the freedom index. They
clearly support that the highest impact on income inequality comes from the regulation part,
while the findings with respect to the legal system and property rights also provide strong
evidence  on  the  impact  of  these  two components  on  income inequality.  In  other  words,
increasing the regulatory supervision over the economy leads to lower income inequality,
given that such regulatory activities are in relevance to labour market regulations, banking
regulations, legal activity and government activity regulations.
The paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2 discusses  the  data,  while  Section  3
presents the empirical results for the linear model, as well as robustness tests across the major
5areas of the EFW and across regions. Section 4 presents the non-linear results and, finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 DATA
Annual  observations  for  an  unbalanced  panel  of  138 countries  are  obtained.  The  list  of
countries  is  provided  in  the  Appendix  along  with  their  time  span  of  data  availability.
Inequality data on the Gini coefficient come from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID) produced by Solt (2013). The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient
(GINI), a proxy for inequality. The Gini Coefficient can vary with ranges from 0 (perfect
income equality) to 1 (perfect income inequality). Gini coefficient data are based on both
gross (GGINI) and net income (NGINI). The primary independent variable of interest is the
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index provided by the Fraser Institute, compiled by
Gwartney et al. (2006). The EFW measures the degree of economic freedom in five main
areas: [1] Size of Government; [2] Legal System and Security of Property Rights; [3] Sound
Money; [4] Freedom to Trade Internationally; [5] Regulation of business, credit and labour.
Each component is measured from 0 (i.e., no economic freedom) to 10 (i.e., full economic
freedom)1. We examine the effects not only of the overall index, but also of all five major
areas of the index which are important for creating greater equality in income. These areas
include: the size of government (GOVSIZE), legal system and security of property rights
(PROP), sound money (MONEY), freedom to trade internationally (TRADE), and regulation
(REG). Other control variables used are based upon the previous literature. In particular, we
include per capita income (CAPINC) to capture the level of development of a country, the
unemployment rate (UN), the college attainment rates (COL) to measure literacy, the share of
the labour force in the manufacturing sector (LABMFG); the dependency ratio (DEP); the
share of women in the labour force (WOMEN), and population density (POPDEN). These
data series are from the World Bank database. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all of
the variables used in this study for the entire sample along with data sources.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
_________________________________
1 The index is calculated using arithmetic averages (see Gwartney et al. 2012 for greater details).
63 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.1 Baseline Panel Cointegration Tests
After confirming that the respective variables are integrated of order one (the unit root test
results are available upon request), the analysis implements Pedroni’s (1999) heterogeneous
panel cointegration tests to determine whether a long-run equilibrium relationship is present.
The baseline results are based on the net income version of the Gini coefficient with the
modelling approach yielding:
GINIit = αi + δi t + β1i EFWit + β2i CAPINCit + β3i UNit + β4i COLit + β5i LABMFGit +
   β6i DEPit + β7i WOMENit + β8i POPDENit + εit (1)
where studies i = 1,...,N for each country in the panel and t = 1,...,T refers to the time period.
The  parameters  αi and  δi allow  for  the  possibility  of  country-specific  fixed  effects  and
deterministic  trends,  respectively.  Following  Pedroni  (1999),  both  within  and  between
dimension approaches to panel cointegration tests are performed. The results are reported in
Panel  A  of  Table  2  and  they  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  cointegration  at  the  1%
significance level.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3.2 Long-Run Baseline Panel Parameter Estimates
With the presence of cointegration, we employ fully modified OLS (FMOLS) approaches to
arrive at the long-run parameter estimates. Panel B of Table 2 reports the long-run estimates
of  Equation  (1).  The  Economic  Freedom Index  yields  a  statistically  significant  negative
impact on income inequality with the net income Gini index. Increases in economic freedom
by a single point have a net income Gini measure 0.046 lower than a country with the same
initial level of economic freedom, all else equal. Moreover, both per capita income and the
unemployment  rate  render  a  statistically  significant  positive  effect  on  income inequality,
while the college attainment rate renders a statistically significant negative effect on it. The
findings are consistent with certain previous studies in the relevant literature (Scully, 2002;
Ashby and Sobel, 2008; Clark and Lawson, 2008), but opposite to those provide by Bergh
and Nilsson (2010) and Sturm and De Haan (2015). They suggest that increases in economic
7freedom over the time span under study are associated with lower income inequality and are
close to those provided by Sturm and De Haan (2015), though they made use of a different
country sample as well as different control variables. Our findings lie within the range of
estimates  other  studies  generated,  i.e.  the  distribution  of  the economic  freedom estimates
ranges from -0.030 to 0.471, depending on the methodological approach followed, as well as
on the country sample.
The positive  estimates  associated  with  per  capita  income illustrate  that  per  capita
income contributes  to  higher  income inequality,  implying a  trade-off  between higher  per
capita  income  and  greater  income  equality.  A  positive  relationship  between  income  and
inequality  is  supported  in  the  studies  by  Forbes  (2000)  and  Voitchovsky  (2005),  while
Deininger and Squire (1996) do not record a strong relationship between these two variables.
The results also indicate a negative coefficient on college attainment, implying that a better
educated population leads to lower income inequality. The findings also illustrate a positive
association between income inequality and unemployment. Finally, in terms of the remaining
control  variables,  the  findings  illustrate  that  there  exists  a  negative  association  between
income inequality and the share of labour force in manufacturing, the dependency ratio and
the share of women in the labour force, while there is a positive relationship between income
inequality and the density ratio.
3.3 Robustness Tests: The Gross Income Version of the Gini Coefficient
This part of the analysis makes use of gross income Gini coefficients, as we are interested in
the income inequality resulting from market processes. The new results are reported in Table
3 and they signify the similarities to those reported in Table 2. The variables included in the
long-run  vector  retain  not  only  their  expected  theoretical  signs,  but  also  their  statistical
significance. However, they turned out to be lower. In particular, the new estimates illustrate
that a country which increases economic freedom by a single point has a gross income Gini
measure 0.039 lower than a country with the same initial level of economic freedom, all else
equal.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Moreover, Sturm and De Haan (2015) argue that employing the aggregate EFW index leads
to biased estimates as the aggregate index includes income redistribution via the government
8sector, where redistribution is measured by the share of transfers and subsidies to GDP. A
substantial part of transfers and subsidies is not aimed at redistribution. Thus, this part of the
analysis  makes  use of a  new EFW index (NEFW) which  has  been constructed  from the
original data and which decreases the contribution of the size of government component by
ignoring the transfers and subsidies items. We measure the Gini coefficient through its gross
income variant. The new results are reported in Table 4.
As we can clearly see, they depict a similar picture as before. The impact of economic
freedom  on  income  inequality  is  still  negative  and  statistically  significant,  albeit  its
quantitative  impact  has  been reduced.  In  particular,  a  country  which  increases  economic
freedom by a single point has a net income gross Gini measure 0.028 lower than a country
with the same initial level of economic freedom, all else equal.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
3.4 Robustness Tests: A Disaggregated Approach-The Areas of the EFW Index
While Tables 2 and 3 present the long-run parameter estimates for the overall index, this part
of  the  analysis  follows  Bergh  and  Nilsson  (2010)  and  presents  the  long-run  parameter
estimates across all five major areas of the EFW index, i.e. size of government, legal system
and  property  rights,  sound  money,  freedom to  trade  internationally,  and  regulation.  The
results are reported in Table 5. 
Panel A documents the presence of cointegration between income inequality (with the
Gini coefficient being measured through its net version) and each component of the EFW
index, while Panel B reports the long-run estimates. The new findings highlight the negative
association between income inequality and all five major areas of the EFW index, while the
remaining control variables coefficients retain their expected sign. We can clearly support
that the highest (negative) impact on income inequality comes from the regulation part. The
results  with respect  to  the  legal  system and property  rights  receive  statistical  support  by
Bennett  (2014) who also derived the importance of the regulatory component for income
inequality.
The empirical findings imply that increasing (quantitatively and/or qualitatively) the
regulatory  supervision  over  the  economy  leads  to  lower  income  inequality,  i.e.  tighter
9supervision decreases income inequality. The results point out to the need for more and better
supervision  over  a  number  of  regulatory  dimensions,  such as  labour  market  regulations,
banking  regulations,  legal  activity  and  government  activity  regulations.  Finally,  all  five
estimated  equations  satisfy  a  number  of  diagnostic  criteria  (i.e.,  residual  correlation  and
modelling specification), rendering higher validity to our estimates.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
3.5 Robustness Tests: An Alternative Definition of Inequality
Bennett (2014) argues that the investigation of the economic freedom and income inequality
nexus is highly sensitive to the choice of inequality measure. This part of the robust empirical
analysis makes use of an alternative definition of income inequality, such as the Theil index
(THEIL). A Theil index of 0 indicates perfect equality. Data on the Theil index are obtained
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics.
Table 5 reports the new cointegration results along with the corresponding estimations. The
results in Panel A validate the presence of cointegration, while those presented in Panel B
indicate that, once again, economic freedom exerts a statistically significant negative effect
on  income  inequality.  These  findings  indicate  that  a  country  which  increased  economic
freedom by a single point has a net income Theil measure 0.040 lower than a country with the
same initial level of economic freedom, all else equal.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
4 A NON-LINEAR APPROACH
There is a particular strand in the literature that supports the argument that changes in the
background of an economic freedom index take time to find their way to change the course of
income inequality (Carter, 2006; Bennett and Vedder, 2013). According to this literature, the
employment of a linear methodological framework is not able to capture the exact form of the
relationship under scrutiny. Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that as economic growth occurs,
income inequality may initially increase with structural change, and then decrease in the long
run,  beyond  a  certain  point.  This  proposition  known  as  the  inverted-U  hypothesis  has
relevance for the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality. At the early
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stages  of  economic  freedom,  income  inequality  can  increase  due  to  market  allocation
benefiting high income groups, however, in later stages, as income rises and the standard of
living overall improves, income inequality can fall. Additionally, the economies included in
our  sample  are  at  different  stages  of  development,  while  they  run  different  economic
institutions and policies and, therefore,  experience income inequality patterns. Within this
framework,  it  is  expected  that  initially  the  benefits  coming  from the  growth process  are
reaped off by the upper part of the income inequality, while beyond a threshold growth point
these benefits can reach the lower part of the same distribution (Bennett and Vedder, 2013).
Hopkins  and  Blythe  (2012)  find  evidence  in  favour  of  a  non-linear  effect  of  regulatory
freedom on inequality.
Following the above discussion posed by the relevant references, this part of the study
makes use of the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model, proposed by Gonzàlez
et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005). This approach authorizes a smooth transition, for a weak
number of thresholds. It presents two main advantages: first, a PSTR specification allows the
income inequality-economic freedom coefficient to vary not only across countries, but also
over time. Second, this approach allows for a smooth change in country-specific correlation,
depending upon the threshold variables.
Table  7  presents  the  empirical  findings  of  income  inequality-economic  freedom
relationship, with the Gini coefficient being measured by its net income variant. As PSTR
starts with defining the degree of non-linearity and the number of thresholds (no remaining
heterogeneity), the preliminary findings guide us to select the number of transition functions.
In our case the residual sum of squares and the criteria of information lead us to choose one
threshold level and one transition function. The economic freedom threshold with respect to
the  aggregate  index  appears  at  5.428.  The  EFW effect  below  this  level  is  positive  and
statistically  significant,  while  above this  level  it  turns out  to be negative  and statistically
significant. Under the regime of strong increases in economic freedom (>5.428), other things
being equal,  an increase  of  one  unit  in  economic  freedom reduces  income inequality  by
0.029, whereas in the other regime (<5.428) the effect of the index turns out to be positive
and statistically significant, 0.035. The empirical findings indicate that in countries with an
economic freedom index below this threshold level, higher inequality is the norm (provided
that economic freedom is on the rise), whereas in countries with an economic freedom index
above this threshold level, reductions in income inequality are recorded for additional degrees
11
in economic freedom. Finally, the statistical  significance of the LMF statistic leads to the
rejection of the linear ‘income inequality–economic freedom’ relationship.
Similar results are obtained in terms of the major areas of the EFW index, with the
stronger results coming from the regulation component. In particular, with respect to the size
of  the government,  legal  system and property rights,  sound money,  the freedom to trade
internationally, and regulation, the thresholds appear at 5.236, 4.435, 3.873, 4.908 and 5.819,
respectively.  The  corresponding  effects  below  these  levels  are  positive  and  statistically
significant,  while above them they turn to be negative and statistically significant.  Across
both regimes (i.e., below and above the threshold), the strongest effect appears in relevance to
regulation,  indicating  that  regulatory  actions  should  be stricter  for  high levels  of  income
inequalities. 
[Insert Table 7 about here]
5 CONCLUSIONS
This study employed both a linear and a non-linear panel cointegration modelling approach to
identify  the  long-run  equilibrium  relationship  between  economic  freedom  and  income
inequality for an expanded worldwide country sample (i.e., 138 countries) as well as both the
aggregate and the major areas of an economic freedom index. The linear long-run parameter
estimates documented that the association under study was negative,  while the non-linear
long-run parameter estimates illustrated that above a threshold point the association between
economic  freedom  and  income  inequality  retained  its  negative  sign,  while  below  this
threshold point the association turned out to be positive. It is worth pointing out here, that our
results receive empirical support from those reported by Bennett and Vedder (2013) in the
case of the U.S., but are different from those provided by Carter (2006). The presence of
homogeneity in the results could probably explain the differentiation of the findings due to
the absence of variation across countries in macrolevel economic institutions as Bennett and
Vedder  (2013)  recommend  and  which  could  be  explored  in  future  research  venues.  The
findings remained robust to the disaggregated areas of the economic freedom index.
Despite the quantity of the empirical findings obtained, it is still not easy to provide
rational  policy  implications.  Higher  economic  freedom  seems  to  recommend  lower
government  sizes,  but this  could also imply lower government  expenses, such as transfer
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programmes by the government to support social benefits, eventually leading to higher taxes,
which seems to be contradictory to lower governmental sizes. However, further research is
needed to reach solid conclusions in relevance to the above arguments.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
________________________________________________________________________
Variables Mean SD Min Max Data sources
________________________________________________________________________
NGINI 37.2 9.2 21.1 62.4 SWIID
GGINI 49.6 9.6 26.9 81.5 SWIID
EFW   4.9 2.1   2.3   6.9 FreetheWorld
GOVSIZE   4.4 1.8   1.6   9.2 FreetheWorld
PROP   5.9 2.1   1.2   9.9 FreetheWorld
MONEY   6.9 2.0   0.1   9.8  FreetheWorld
TRADE   6.1 1.4   1.3   9.8 FreetheWorld
REG   5.8 1.4   2.6   8.9 FreetheWorld
CAPINC   7.8 1.5   4.2 10.6 World Bank
UN   8.9 5.1   0.6 38.8 World Bank
COL   5.0 5.3   0.1 32.5 World Bank
LABMFG 23.4 7.8   2.1 39.5  World Bank
DEP   0.6 0.2   0.3   1.3 World Bank
WOMEN 28.7 3.6 15.6 53.5 World Bank
POPDEN 53.5           18.5   4.2 97.6 World Bank
Theil 22.4 8.3 13.4 57.2 UNIDO
NEFW   4.6 3.8   1.9   6.7 Own calculations
________________________________________________________________________
Notes: The inequality coefficients have been multiplied by 100.
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TABLE 2
BASELINE PANEL COINTEGRATION TESTS AND FMOLS ESTIMATES (THE
GINI COEFFICIENT IS BASED NET INCOME)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Panel cointegration tests
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 46.58931* Group ρ-statistic -45.83295*
Panel ρ-statistic -44.36592* Group PP-statistic -44.94398*
Panel PP-statistic -43.60957* Group ADF-statistic -9.26409*
Panel ADF-statistic -9.31286*
________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Both the panel and group mean panel tests are distributed asymptotically as standard normal. Of the
seven tests, the panel v-statistic is a one-sided test in which large positive values reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration.  For  the  remaining  test  statistics,  large  negative  values  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no
cointegration. Statistical significance at the 1% significance level is denoted by “*”.
Panel B: FMOLS long-run parameter estimates
_________________________________________
NGINI = 1.485 – 0.046 EFW + 0.208 CAPINC + 0.176 UN - 0.138 COL – 0.238 LABMFG
                (8.36)* (-10.8)*         (8.72)*                  (7.59)*       (-7.61)*        (-5.36)*
               -0.046 DEP – 0.085 WOMEN + 2.138 POPDEN
                (-5.41)*         (-4.93)*                (5.82)*
Adj. R2 = 0.62 LM = 1.24 RESET = 1.30
                                  [0.37]              [0.32]
________________________________________________________________________
Notes:  t-statistics  and  probability  values  are  reported  in  parentheses  and  brackets,  respectively.  LM is  the
Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation. RESET is Ramsey’s regression equation specification error test.
Statistical significance at the 1% level is denoted by “*”.
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TABLE 3
PANEL COINTEGRATION TESTS AND FMOLS ESTIMATES (THE GINI
COEFFICIENT IS BASED ON GROSS INCOME)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Panel cointegration tests
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 42.08935* Group ρ-statistic -40.43629*
Panel ρ-statistic -40.25497* Group PP-statistic -39.84371*
Panel PP-statistic -40.51894* Group ADF-statistic -7.42971*
Panel ADF-statistic -7.97093*
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: FMOLS long-run parameter estimates
_________________________________________
NGINI = 1.219 – 0.039 EFW + 0.184 CAPINC + 0.148 UN - 0.117 COL – 0.219 LABMFG
               (6.71)* (-7.92)*          (6.53)*                  (7.14)*       (-6.49)*         (-5.63)*
-0.038 DEP – 0.073 WOMEN + 2.028 POPDEN
(-5.16)*         (-4.62)*                 (5.49)*
Adj. R2 = 0.56 LM = 1.38 RESET = 1.46
                                  [0.31]               [0.25]
________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 2. 
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TABLE 4
PANEL COINETGRATION TESTS AND FMOLS ESTIMATES (THE GROSS INCOME
GINI INDEX AND THE NEW EFW INDEX)
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Panel cointegration tests
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 34.23875* Group ρ-statistic -34.21987*
Panel ρ-statistic -32.75504* Group PP-statistic -33.40025*
Panel PP-statistic -32.86531* Group ADF-statistic -6.68914*
Panel ADF-statistic -6.84096*
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: FMOLS long-run parameter estimates
_________________________________________
GGINI = 0.815 – 0.028 EFW + 0.162 CAPINC + 0.152 UN - 0.117 COL – 0.239 LABMFG
                (3.28)* (-5.62)*          (5.81)*                 (5.96)*       (-5.41)*          (-5.28)*
                 -0.046 DEP – 0.094 WOMEN + 2.128 POPDEN
                 (-5.39)*        (-5.14)*                  (5.36)*
Adj. R2 = 0.45 LM = 1.48 RESET = 1.36
                                  [0.27]              [0.42]
___________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 2.
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TABLE 5
PANEL COINTEGRATION TESTS AND FMOLS ESTIMATES (THE AREAS OF THE
EFW INDEX AND A NET INCOME AND A NET INCOME GINI COEFFICIENT)
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: 
EFW-GOVSIZE
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 43.87405* Group ρ-statistic -43.28830*
Panel ρ-statistic -42.32841* Group PP-statistic -42.15482*
Panel PP-statistic -42.45983* Group ADF-statistic -8.90834*
Panel ADF-statistic -9.15906*
EFW-PROP
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 40.45872* Group ρ-statistic -41.23784*
Panel ρ-statistic -38.47630* Group PP-statistic -38.90635*
Panel PP-statistic -38.82763* Group ADF-statistic -7.32761*
Panel ADF-statistic -6.98307*
EFW-MONEY
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 37.38964* Group ρ-statistic -37.99632*
Panel ρ-statistic -35.13286* Group PP-statistic -35.14985*
Panel PP-statistic -35.32785* Group ADF-statistic -6.20842*
Panel ADF-statistic -6.09841*
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EFW-REG
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 39.36738* Group ρ-statistic -38.09634*
Panel ρ-statistic -37.62073* Group PP-statistic -36.45971*
Panel PP-statistic -37.26582* Group ADF-statistic -6.27831*
Panel ADF-statistic -6.15833*
EFW-REG
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 46.43872* Group ρ-statistic -46.38310*
Panel ρ-statistic -45.60771* Group PP-statistic -45.83507*
Panel PP-statistic -45.53876* Group ADF-statistic -9.43924*
Panel ADF-statistic -9.81375*
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: FMOLS long-run parameter estimates
___________________________________________________________________________
EFW-GOVSIZE
NGINI = 1.279– 0.041 EFW + 0.176 CAPINC + 0.139 UN + - 0.157 COL – 0.204 LABMFG
                (5.36)*(-6.74)*         (6.49)*                   (6.92)*          (-6.70)*        (-4.95)*
               -0.043 DEP – 0.092 WOMEN + 2.159 POPDEN
               (-5.25)*         (-5.28)*                 (5.61)*
Adj. R2 = 0.54 LM = 1.28 RESET = 1.59
                                   [0.35]             [0.22]
EFW-PROP
NGINI = 1.018 – 0.035 EFW + 0.184 CAPINC + 0.145 UN - 0.134 COL – 0.196 LABMFG
                (3.24)* (-5.96)*         (6.18)*                  (5.71)*      (-5.68)*           (5.12)*
                -0.049 DEP – 0.114 WOMEN + 2.255 POPDEN
                 (-5.82)*        (-4.96)*                (5.67)*
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Adj. R2 = 0.47 LM = 1.41 RESET = 1.36
         [0.30] [0.25]
EFW-MONEY
NGINI = 0.984 – 0.031 EFW + 0.168 CAPINC + 0.137 UN - 0.126 COL – 0.159 LABMFG
                (3.48)* (-5.39)*        (5.52)*                   (5.41)*        (-5.40)*        (-4.47)*
                -0.026 DEP – 0.055 WOMEN + 1.1673 POPDEN
                (-4.68)*        (-4.29)*                   (5.02)*
Adj. R2 = 0.43 LM = 1.46 RESET = 1.51
                                 [0.29]              [0.18]
EFW-TRADE
NGINI = 1.118 – 0.038 EFW + 0.177 CAPINC + 0.151 UN - 0.138 COL – 0.236 LABMFG
                (3.74)* (-5.82)*          (5.80)*                 (5.63)*        (-5.61)*         (-5.31)*
                -0.045 DEP – 0.099 WOMEN + 2.147 POPDEN
                (-5.73)*          (-5.18)*                (5.92)*
Adj. R2 = 0.48 LM = 1.32 RESET = 1.44
                                  [0.38]               [0.23]
EFW-REG
NGINI = 1.146 – 0.052 EFW + 0.187 CAPINC + 0.156 UN - 0.138 COL – 0.268 LABMFG
               (3.96)* (-6.73)*          (5.84)*                  (5.68)*       (-5.79)*         (-5.75)*
               -0.064 DEP – 0.095 WOMEN + 2.436 POPDEN
                (-5.71)*        (-5.33)*                 (5.92)*
Adj. R2 = 0.57 LM = 1.32 RESET = 1.38
                                  [0.40]               [0.29]
________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 2.
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TABLE 6
PANEL COINTEGRATION TESTS AND FMOLS ESTIMATES (INCOME INEQUALITY
IS MEASURED AS THE THEIL INDEX)
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Panel cointegration tests
_____________________________
Panel Test Statistics: Group Mean Panel Test Statistics:
Panel v-statistic 41.08452* Group ρ-statistic -41.54822*
Panel ρ-statistic -38.23874* Group PP-statistic -39.70842*
Panel PP-statistic -38.61185* Group ADF-statistic -8.42861*
Panel ADF-statistic -8.16378*
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: FMOLS long-run parameter estimates
_________________________________________
THEIL = 1.006 – 0.040 EFW + 0.188 CAPINC + 0.163 UN - 0.126 COL – 0.214 LABMFG
                 (4.72)* (-6.14)*          (6.37)*                 (6.29)*       (-6.38)*        (-5.47)*
                 -0.041 DEP – 0.083 WOMEN + 2.095 POPDEN
                 (-5.28)*        (-5.39)*                   (5.65)*
Adj. R2 = 0.56 LM = 1.39 RESET = 1.44
                                   [0.32]              [0.37]
___________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 2.
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TABLE 7
NON-LINEAR ESTIMATES (THE GINI COEFFICIENT IS BASED ON NET INCOME)
___________________________________________________________________________
Aggregate EFW
0.029 EFWb+ 0.203 CAPINC + 0.119 UN – 0.185 COL – 0.146 LABMFG
            (5.17)*            (5.26)*                  (5.03)*       (-4.81)*         (-4.55)*
                       -0.038 DEP – 0.063 WOMEN + 1.846 POPDEN
                       (-5.25)*         (-5.03)*                   (5.27)*
GGINI=
-0.035 EFWa + 0.228 CAPINC + 0.136 UN - 0.209 COL – 0.167 LABMFG
                        (-5.28)*             (5.19)*                  (5.62)*      (-5.30)*         (-5.18)*
 -0.055 DEP – 0.082 WOMEN + 2.183 POPDEN
                         (-5.29)*        (-5.46)*                  (5.42)*
q = 5.428 LMF [0.00]
EFW-GOVSIZE
0.015 EFWb + 0.179CAPINC + 0.107 UN - 0.182 COL – 0.157 LABMFG
(4.39)*              (5.39)*               (4.63)*        (-4.81)*          (-4.38)*
-0.028 DEP – 0.048 WOMEN + 1.784 POPDEN
(-4.82)*         (-5.16)*                   (5.36)*
GGINI=      
–0.029 EFWa + 0.224 CAPINC + 0.139 UN - 0.211 COL – 0.179 LABMFG
(-5.53)*             (5.81)*                  (5.53)*        (-5.84)*        (-5.46)*
-0.043 DEP – 0.079 WOMEN + 1.962 POPDEN
(-5.67)*         (-5.66)*                 (5.61)*
q = 5.236 LMF [0.00]
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EFW-PROP
0.022 EFWb + 0.201 CAPINC + 0.125 UN – 0.214 COL – 0.174 LABMFG
(4.75)*            (5.38)*                  (4.90)*        (-5.06)*           (-5.27)*
-0.038 DEP – 0.059 WOMEN + 1.892 POPDEN
(-4.82)*         (-4.80)*                   (5.39)*
GGINI=
–0.038 EFWa + 0.239 CAPINC + 0.163 UN - 0.245 COL – 0.202 LABMFG
(-5.28)*             (5.37)*                  (5.68)*       (-5.62)*        (-5.39)*
-0.064 DEP – 0.075 WOMEN + 2.074 POPDEN
(-5.51)*         (-5.16)*                  (5.48)*
q = 4.435 LMF [0.00]
EFW-MONEY
0.014 EFWb + 0.153 CAPINC + 0.058 UN – 0.138 COL – 0.137 LABMFG
(4.38)*             (4.47)*                 (4.17)*        (-4.40)*         (-4.29)*
-0.024 DEP – 0.041 WOMEN + 1.526 POPDEN
(-4.62)*        (-4.63)*                  (4.71)*
GGINI =
 –0.022 EFWa + 0.172 CAPINC + 0.083 UN - 0.169 COL – 0.160 LABMFG
(-4.48)*              (5.38)*                (4.62)*        (-4.94)*          (4.41)*
-0.035 DEP – 0.062 WOMEN + 1.863 POPDEN
(-5.01)*          (-5.78)*                (5.49)*
q = 3.873 LMF [0.00]
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EFW-TRADE
0.024 EFWb + 0.219 CAPINC + 0.136 UN – 0.219 COL – 0.163 LABMFG
(4.28)*             (4.71)*                 (4.90)*       (-4.53)*          (-4.82)*
-0.035 DEP – 0.056 WOMEN + 2.071 POPDEN
(-5.11)*          (-5.14)*                (4.64)*
GGINI=
–0.041 EFWa + 0.248 CAPINC + 0.164 UN - 0.236 COL – 0.185 LABMFG
(-4.81)*             (5.19)*                  (5.05)*      (-4.92)*          (-5.02)*
-0.050 DEP – 0.079 WOMEN + 2.237 POPDEN
(-4.84)*        (-5.15)*                  (5.48)*
q = 4.908 LMF [0.00]
EFW-REG
0.028 EFWb + 0.237 CAPINC + 0.129 UN – 0.225 COL – 0.186 LABMFG
(4.61)*             (5.14)*                  (4.63)*       (-4.92)*          (-5.15)*
-0.032 DEP – 0.058 WOMEN + 1.938 POPDEN
(-5.21)*        (-5.06)*                   (5.25)*
GGINI=
–0.045 EFWa + 0.258 CAPINC + 0.155 UN - 0.246 COL – 0.237 LABMFG
(-5.21)*             (5.26)*                  (4.78)*       (-4.85)*         (-5.64)*
-0.059 DEP – 0.073 WOMEN + 2.319 POPDEN
(-4.82)*        (-5.70)*                   (5.64)*
q = 5.819 LMF [0.00]
___________________________________________________________________________
Notes: b denotes ‘below’ and a denotes ‘above’, q is the threshold parameter. Figures in brackets denote p-
values, while those in parentheses denote t-statistics. The LMF statistic measures whether the regime switching
is significant or not, i.e. the test of linearity versus PSTR in which the null is the validity of the linear model.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
LIST OF COUNTRIES (TIME SPAN OF DATA AVAILABILITY IN PARENTHESES
___________________________________________________________________________
Europe
Albania (1996-2004) Norway (1963-2010)
Austria (1964-2010) Poland (1960-2010)
Belarus (1981-2007) Portugal (1973-2010)
Belgium (1974-2010) Romania (1963-2010)
Bulgaria (1960-2010) Russia (1981-2009)
Croatia (1986-2009) Slovak Republic (1987-2010)
Cyprus (1990-2009) Slovenia (1987-2010)
Czech Republic (1987-2010) Spain (1963-2010)
Denmark (1961-2010) Sweden (1960-2010)
Estonia (1981-2010) 
Finland (1962-2010) Switzerland (1980-2009)
France (1962-2010) Ukraine (1972-2007)
FYROM (1989-2007) U.K. (1960-2010)
Germany (1964-2010) America
Greece (1967-2010) Argentina (1961-2010)
Hungary (1962-2010) Bahamas (1970-2004)
Iceland (1992-2010) Barbados (1970-1997)
Ireland (1963-2009) Belize (1993-2006)
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Italy (1967-2010) Bolivia (1983-2007)
Latvia (1981-2010) Brazil (1970-2009)
Lithuania (1981-2010) Canada (1961-2009)
Luxembourg (1970-2010) Chile (1967-2009)
Malta (2000-2010) Colombia (1962-2009)
Moldova (1981-2010) Costa Rica (1965-2009)
Netherlands (1962-2010) Dominican Republic (1986-2009)
Ecuador (1963-2009) Iran (1963-2004)
El Salvador (1965-2008) Israel (1961-2005)
Guatemala (1971-2006) Japan (1961-2010)
Honduras (1963-2009) Jordan (1963-2006)
Jamaica (1963-2004) Kazakhstan (1981-2006)
Mexico (1968-2010) Korea (1963-2010)
Nicaragua (1982-2009) Kuwait (1982-2009)
Panama (1960-2009) Kyrgy Republic (1981-2007)
Paraguay (1990-2009) Laos (1992-2007)
Peru (1970-2009) Malaysia (1968-2005)
Puerto Rico (1977-2010) Mongolia (1995-2006)
Trinidad and Tobago (1966-2005) Nepal (1976-2004)
Uruguay (1976-2009) Oman (1981-2010)
U.S. (19602-1010) Pakistan (1963-2005)
Venezuela (1965-2010) Papua New Guinea (1995-2005)
Asia
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Armenia (1986-2007) Philippines (1961-2009)
Azerbaijan (1972-2008) Qatar (1981-2009)
Bangadesh (1963-2010) Singapore (1963-2009)
Brunei (1999-2010) Saudi Arabia (1981-2009)
Cambodia (1994-2004) Sri Lanka (1979-2002)
China (1964-2005) Taiwan (1964-2005)
Georgia (1981-2006) Tajikistan (1981-2004)
Guinea (1991-2006) Thailand (1967-2004)
Haiti (1987-2001) Turkey (1963-2009)
Hong-Kong (1971-2006) Turkmenistan (1981-2005)
India (1960-2005) Uzbekistan ((1981-2005)
Indonesia (1964-2010) Vietnam (1992-2006).
Pacific
Australia (1960-2010)
Fiji (1977-1998)
New Zealand (1963-2007)
Africa
Algeria (1967-2005) Nigeria (1963-2004)
Angola (1995-2005) Rwanda (1985-2006)
Botswana (1981-2005) Senegal (1970-2005)
Burundi (1992-2006) Sierra Leone (1976-2005)
Cameroon (1983-2002) South Africa (1965-2005)
Cape Verde (1989-2005) Swaziland (1994-2005)
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Central Africa Republic (1992-2003) Tanzania (1964-2001)
Cote d’Ivoire (1966-2002) Tunisia (1965-2005)
Egypt (1964-2008) Uganda (1963-2006)
Ethiopia (1979-2005) Zambia (1963-2005)
Ghana (1983-2006) Zimbabwe (1963-1995)
Kenya (1960-2005)
Lesotho (1986-2005)
Madagascar (1976-2005)
Malawi (1969-2005)
Mali (1989-2006)
Mauritania (1987-2000)
Mauritius (1972-2006)
Moroco (1965-2007)
Mozambique (1996-2005)
Namibia (1993-2005)
Níger (1992-2005)
___________________________________________________________________________
